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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

BESSIE AUERBACH, MADELINE
A. WERNER, and SELMA A.
MOHR,
Plaintiffs, and Appellants,
-vs.-

Case No. 8979

FANNIE F. A. SAMUELS, L. R.
SAMUELS, FREDERICK F 0 X
AUERBACH, and WALKER BANK
& TRUST COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by plaintiffs and appellants from a
judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr., Judge, presiding, construing the will of Frederick S. Auerbach, deceased.
Under the provisions of the aforesaid will, the residue
of the estate was placed in trust with the income therefrom
to be paid to decedent's wife for life, then to decedent's
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son for life and upon the son's death, the principal to be
paid to the then living issue of the son, and, in default of
issue, to decedent's living sisters. In question here is
whether under the terms of the will the trust may be
partially terminated during the lifetime of the wife and
one third of the principal paid to the son if he is 30 years
of age and an additional one third if he has arrived at
45 years of age or, in the trustee's discretion, two thirds'
of the principal paid to the son irrespective of age.
Plaintiffs and appellants are the living sisters of decedent. Defendants and respondents are the duly appointed
and acting trustees of the trust.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the court
below ruled that in the event of the voluntary release or
renunciation of the wife's life interest in the income of
the trust, the trust would thereupon partially terminate
in the same way and to the same effect as if the wife had
died at the moment of the termination of her life interest
in the trust. The trustees under the Court's ruling would
then have the duties and discretions to make payments or
distributions of income and principal from the trust to
the son in such amounts as would have been payable or
distributable to him in the event of his Mother's death.
Plaintiffs and appellants appeal fron1 this part of the
Court's ruling upon the gTound that the trust being an
art in-, continuing trust "·ith purposes of the testator still
to he accotnplished, cannot be either totally or partially
terminated prior to the specific titne of termination pre-
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scribed in the trust instrument, either with or without the
consent of all of the beneficiaries under the trust, including unborn issue of the son as well as plaintiffs and
appellants who are contingent beneficiaries under the
trust.
No appeal is taken by plaintiffs and appellants from
paragraph 7 of the judgment below holding that the
term "issue," as used in the will, refers to natural descendants and does not include adopted children. The
facts are taken from the pleadings.
Frederick S. Auerbach died testate on May 28, 1938,
at Salt Lake City, Utah, and his last will and testament
was duly admitted to probate in the Probate Court of
Salt Lake County on June 15, 1938. The decedent nominated and appointed his wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach
(who has subsequently married the defendant L. F.
Samuels) as executrix and trustee under the will. At the
time of h~s death, decedent was about 48 years of age and
left surviving him his wife, Fannie, and one son, Frederick Fox Auerbach, then about 11 years of age. The
will had been executed in Hartford, Connecticut, on
February 15, 1936, when the decedent was 46 years of
age.
The residue of the estate in accordance with the will
was transferred by decedent's wife, Fannie, as executrix,
to the trust on or about July 3, 1946. Under the provisions
of the will, thy wife was initially appointed and qualified

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

as a trustee. L. F. Samuels was appointed a co-trustee
on July 3, 1946, Walker Bank & Trust Company a cotrustee on July 12, 1948, and the son, Frederick Fox
Auerbach, a co-trustee on July 2, 1948, upon his arrival
at the age of 21 years. The son became 30 years of age
in June, 1957, and has no issue presently born.
In June, 195 7, defendant, L. R. Samuels, negotiated
with plaintiffs for the purchase of 2,283 shares of common
stock of the Auerbach Company owned by plaintiffs,
said number of shares comprising approximately a one
third interest in said company. Among the assets of the
Frederick S. Auerbach trust is a similar one third interest
in the company, the remaining one third interest being
owned by Beatrice Fox Auerbach of Hartford, Connecticut, and her children. Beatrice and Fannie are sisters
who married Auerbach brothers, George and Frederick.
George had predeceased Frederick by several years. A
third brother, Herbert, never married and died in 1945.
After prices and terms had been agreed upon during
the aforesaid negotiations, plaintiffs were informed and
thereby discovered that the defendant trustees intended to
secure a release from the widow, Fannie, of her life interest in the trust and thereupon convey, pursuant to an
assignment to be secured from the son, Frederick Fox
Auerbach, a two-thirds interest in the properties of the
trust to four new trusts to be known as the First, Second,
Third and Fourth Frederick F. Auerbach trusts. These
trusts were to be created for the purpose of acquiring
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common stock of the Auerbach Company, with each
trust containing a divided one fourth of the one third of
Auerbach stock to be acquired from plaintiffs and the one
third of Auerbach stock to be transferred from the Frederick S. Auerbach trust. For the purpose of raising the
money to pay plaintiffs, the four new trusts planned to
borrow the money from Walker Bank & Trust Company
upon the security of the assets of the four new trusts. Trustees of the four new trusts were to be Frederick Fox Auerbach, Fannie F. A. Samuels, L. R. Samuels, Walker Bank
& Trust Company and in each case a daughter or a sonin-law of Beatrice Fox Auerbach. These trusts created a
life estate for the son, Frederick Fox Auerbach, and his
wife and at the conclusion of the trusts1 the principal was
to be distributed to his natural children and, in default
of such issue, to the grandchildren or descendants of
Beatrice Fox Auerbach.
When plaintiffs and appellants learned of the proposed
plan of decedent's widow to release her life estate and,
in concert with her son and the other trustees, to effect
a partial termination of the trust to the extent of twothirds of the principal thereof, all further negotiations for
the sale of the stock were terminated.
The present suit was filed by plaintiffs on or about
August 29, 1957 asking that the four defendant trustees
comply with the terms of the will and be enjoined from
unlawfully invading and distributing any part of the
principal of the trust to decedent's son, Frederick Fox
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Auerbach, during the lifetime of his Mother. Plaintiffs
asked the Court to construe the will and determine:
"A. What would be the legal effect of a release
by the widow, Fannie F. A. Samuels, of her right
to receive the income from said trust fund during
her natural life?
Would such release effectively terminate her
right to receive the income of said trust during her
natural life?
Would such release accelerate the right of Frederick Fox Auerbach to receive the income from
said trust during his natural life?
Would such release accelerate the right of Fredreick Fox Auerbach to receive any part of the
principal' of the trust?
Would such release empower the trustees to
anticipate and invade the principal of the trust
prior to the death of said Fannie F. A. Samuels,
and to pay any part of the principal of said trust
to the son, Frederick. Fox Auerbach; and, if so, at
what age or ages and in what amount or
amounts?"
A construction of the word "issue" and whether it would
include adopted children, was likewise requested. Plaintiffs also prayed for attorneys' fees and costs and disbursements of suit.
The pertinent provisions of the will of Frederick S.
Auerbach, deceased, are contained in paragraphs Fourth
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and Sixth and read as follows:
"FOURTH: I give, devise and bequeath all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, of
every nature and kind, wheresoever the same may
be situated, to my Trustees hereinafter named in
trust however, the income therefrom to be paid to
my beloved wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach, for and
during the term of her natural life, and upon her
death, or in case my said wife shall die before I
die, to my son, Frederick Fox Auerbach, for and
during the term of his natural life, excepting that
if my said son Frederick Fox Auerbach, at the time
of the death of my said wife, or at the time of my
death should my said wife predecease me, shall
have reached the age of forty-five years, my trustees are directed to pay over and deliver to him
two-thirds of the principal of the trust fund, and
pay the income from the remaining one-third to
him so long as he shall live, but if my said son shall
not have reached the age of forty-five years, but
shall have reached the age of thirty years at the
time of the death of my said wife, or at the time of
my death should my said wife predecease me, then
my Trustees are to pay over and deliver oll!e-third
of the principal of the trust to my said son, paying
the income from the remaining principal to him
until he reaches the age of forty-five years when
one-half of the remaining balance of principal of
the trust fund shall be paid to my said son, and
the income from the other half shall be paid to
him so long as he shall live. Should my said son
not have arrived at the age of thirty years at the
time of the death of my said wife, or at the time
of my death should his mother predecease me, then
do I direct my Trustees to pay over and deliver
one-third of the principal of the trust to my said
son when he reaches the age of thirty years, and
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one-half of the balance of the principal when my
said son reaches the age of forty-five years.
I authorize and empower my said trustees, in
their discretion, to anticipate payment of the principal amounts which my said son, pursuant to the
terms of this my Will, is entitled to receive at the
respective ages of thirty and forty-five years, and
such anticipated payments, in the sole discretion of
my Trustees, are to be made at one time, or from
time to time, but never to exceed one-third of the
principal before, nor one-half of the balance after,
my son reaches the age of thirty years.
Upon the death of my said son Frederick Fox
Auerbach, or in case my said son shall predecease my wife, then upon the death of my said
wife, the trust hereby created shall cease and
terminate, and tlie principal thereof shall be paid
over and delivered to the then living issue of my
said son, the same to be theirs, share and share
alike, per stirpes and not per capita. Should my
said son die without leaving issue, then upon his
death, or upon the death of my said wife should my
son predecease her, do I direct my said Trustees to
pay over and deliver the principal of the trust to
my living sisters, the same to be theirs share and
share alike."
"SIXTH: I hereby nominate and appoint my
beloved wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach, to be the
Executrix of this my Last Will and Testament, and
the Trustee of any trust that may arise hereunder,
and as Guardian of our said son, to serve without
bond or undertaking of any name or nature. In
case she shall predecease me, or refuse or be unable to serve, then I nominate and appoint Beatrice Fox Auerbach, of Hartford, Connecticut, as
Executrix and as Trustee aforesaid, and as Guard-
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9
ian of F::ederick Fox Auerbach, without bond or
undertaking of any name or nature, to serve for
reasonable compensation.
In case my said son Frederick Fox Auerbach
shall, at the time of my death, be of the age of
twenty-one years, I nominate and appoint him as
co-Executor of this my Last Will and Testament
and co-Trustee of any trust herein created, and
direct that he qualify as such without the necessity
of furnishing any bond.
In case my said son shall not be of the age of
twenty-one years, at the time of my death, then
do I direct that when my said son reaches the
age of twenty-one years he qualify as co-Trustee
of any trust herein created, and I direct that he
qualify as such without ~he necessity of furnishing
any bond.
I invest my Executrix or Executors and also any
Trustee herein provided for ·with all of the rights,
authority and powers of control and management
over my estate and the items thereof, including the
power to invest and reinvest the funds thereof, to
sell and otherwise dispose of, transfer and in every
way deal in and with, and handle the estate and its
assets to the same extent and with like force and
effect as I myself would have if living and without
the interposition of any court or tribunal whatsoever.
In addition to the foregoing general powers, I
specifically authorize and empower my Executrix,
Executors, Trustee or Trustees to sell, mortgage,
lease and/or convey the whole, or any part, of
any property of which I may die seized, or which
may come into her or their possession as such,
without the necessity of obtaining any order, or
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orders, therefor from the Probate Court for the
District in which this Will is probated.
I expressly authorize and empower my said Executrix, Executors, Trustee or Trustees, in her or
their discretion, to execute leases on the whole, or
on any portion, of any property which constitutes
my estate, or the estate of any trust herein created,
for such period of time as such Executrix, Executor, Trustee or Trustees may deem for the best
interests of my estate or any trust herein created.
Whenever any part of my estate, or trust estate
created herein, is to be paid over to any beneficiary, my said Executrix, Executors, Trustee or
Trustees may, in their discretion, in lieu of money,
pay over and transfer to the person, or persons,
entitled to receive the same, such securities, or
such real or personal property, or interest therein,
as my said Executrix, Executors, Trustee or Trustees shall deem to be a fair equivalent for the
amount which is to be paid over, the judgment of
my Executrix, Executors, Trustee or Trustees, with
respect to such valuation and apportionment to be
conclusive.
I authorize and empower my said Trustees or
Trustee, to delegate the power herein given to
them, or to her, to any Bank,. having power to act
as Trustee and organized under the National Banking Act, or under the laws of the States of Utah
or Connecticut, and located either in Salt Lake
City, Utah, or Hartford, Conn.
I authorize and empower my said Trustee, or
Trustees, without the necessity of delegating any
powers, to engage the services, for such period of
time, and under such ter~s as. she, or they, may see
fit, of any such Bank as IS designated above, to act
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as agent, or to discharge any of the duties which
may be required in the administration of my estate, or any trust herein created.
I hereby authorize and empower my said Trustee, or Trustees, to add to their number, and in
the event of any vacancy, either by death or resignation, to fill the same, recording the designation
of such succeeding Trustee in any Probate Court
in which this my Will is probated, and such succeeding Trustee shall qu~J,ify without! the necessity
of furnishing any bond.
Wherever I have used the word "Trustees" in
this my Will, the powers given to them shall apply
not alone to those Trustees herein named, but also
to the survivors, or survivor, of them, and to any
succeeding Trustee.''
The judgment' of the Court below entered on October
31, 1958, was as follows:
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. By paragraph Fourth of his last Will and
Testament, dated February 15, 1936, Frederick
S. Auerbach, deceased, gave, devised and bequeathed certain property to his Trustees in
trust for specified purposes.
2. Defendant Fannie F. A. Samuels is the present life beneficiary of the trust estate and as such
has the right to receive the income from the trust
during the term of her natural life.
3. The Will of FrederickS. Auerbach does not
limit the right of Fannie F. A. Samuels to release,
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assign, sell or otherwise dispose of her interest in
the trust and she may dispose of such interest as
she sees fit.
4. Upon the effective termination, in any way,
of the interest owned by the present life beneficiary
the interests of the other beneficiaries in the trust
will be accelerated, and the Trustees will have the
duties and discretions to make payments or distributions of income and principal to such persons
and in such amounts as they would or could have
paid or distributed had the present life beneficiary died at the moment of termination of such
interest in the trust.
5. The interest owned by the present life beneficiary may be effectively terminated by the beneficiary releasing the Trustees from their obligations
to the said beneficiary under the trust; provided,
however, that this shall not be construed as a
declaration that release is the only effective means
of termination of the life estate during the lifetime
of the owner of the present life interest.
6. Upon the death of Fannie F. A. Samuels
and Frederick Fox Auerbach, or upon the death
of Frederick Fox Auerbach if the life estate now
held by Fannie F. A. Samuels has been effectively
terminated prior to his death, the trust is to be
terminated and the trust property distributed to
the issue of Frederick Fox Auerbach living at the
time of his death, but in default of issue to others.
7. The term "issue" as used in the above paragraph and in the 'Yill provision on which it is
based refers to natural descendants and does not
include children adopted bv Frederick Fox Auerbach or his natural descendants.
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8. The other relief asked for by the parties is
denied.
9.

Each of the parties is to bear his own costs."

POINT I
THERE CAN BE NO PARTIAL TERMINATION
OF THE FREDERICKS. AUERBACH TRUST AND
INVASION OF PRINCIPAL BY THE SON DURING
THE LIFETIME OF HIS MOTHER CONTRARY
TO THE INTENTION AND EXPRESS TERMS OF
THE TRUST INSTRUMENT AND WITH MATERIAL OBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF THE TESTA- ·
TOR REMAINING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, THE
TRUST MUST CONTINUE FOR THE PERIOD OF
TIME PRESCRIBED IN THE TRUST INSTRUMENT EVEN IF THE INTERESTS OF NON-CONSENTING C 0 NT I N G E N T BENEFICIARIES
WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED BY THE PREMATURE TERMINATION OF THE TRUST.
The Court below in construing the will of Frederick S.
Auerbach held that in the event decedent's widow relinquished her life interest in the income from the trust
established under the will, the trust would thereupon be
automatically terminated in part to the same effect as if
the widow had died. Under this construction of the trust
instrument, the trustees would immediately upon relinquishment of the widow's life interest, be under the mandatory duty of paying one-third of the trust principal to
the son, he now having reached the age of 30. The trustees would also then immediately have the discretion to
pay an additional one-third of the principal to the son
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and be under the mandatory duty to do so when he
reaches the age of 45.
The construction placed upon the will by the Court
below was erroneous for the simple reason that the will
specifically provides and shows the clear intention of the
testator that there can be no invasion of principal by the
son and no termination of the trust in whole or in part
during the lifetime of the Mother whether or not she
relinquishes her life interest in the income from the trust
prior to her death. The effect of the Court's interpretation
is to re-write the testator's will and permit the widow by
her sole action or by agreement with her son, to extinguish
and destroy the rights of plaintiffs and appellants, as
sisters of the deceased and contingent beneficiaries under
the will, in and to two-thirds of the trust estate. The
effect also is to similarly extinguish and destroy the rights
of any unborn issue of the son who if born and the son
predeceased the widow, would be entitled to take the
trust estate on the widow's death instead of plaintiffs.
The effect, in short, is to defeat and frustrate the intentions of the testator, prevent the purposes for which the
trust was created from being accomplished and permit
the partial destruction of a trust prior to the expiration
of the specific period prescribed for its duration by the
testator.
Under applicable authorities, the question in this case
whether the trust will terminate, in part, by the relinquishment of the widow's life interest in the income from the
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trust in exactly the same way it would have terminated if
she died, is strictly and solely a question of the testator's
intention. This intention is the governing and deciding
factor.
As shown hereafter, we take the law to be absolutely
settled and clear that a testamentary trust imposing active
duties upon the trustees and created to accomplish certain objects and purposes of the testator and to exist for
a specified term of years or until the happening of certain
specified events cannot be terminated by the agreement
of the beneficiaries even if all the beneficiaries agree and
consent to such termination. It is equally well settled
and clear that a trust created for a specified period of
time cannot be terminated in any event where the interests
of non-consenting beneficiaries would be prejudiced by
the proposed termination.
Under the facts of the present case, the intention of
FrederickS. Auerbach is manifest on the face of the testamentary instrument whereby he created a trust for the
benefit of his wife, his son, his son's issue, and his sisters.
The will was carefully drawn and discloses a carefully
thought out and well considered plan of testamentary
disposition. The language is plain that the trust corpus
was to remain intact and no invasion thereof permitted
by any one or for any purpose during the lifetime of his
wife, Fannie. The trust estate was to stay in one piece,
no matter what, until his wife's death. This intent is
made doubly plain when the trust instrument is con-
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sidered in the light of the testator's family situation and
the nature of the decedent's assets which were placed in
trust under the terms of his will.
Frederick S. Auerbach at the time of his death was
only 48 years of age and a relatively young man. His will
had been executed only two years previously in Hartford,
Connecticut. It was witnessed by his wife's family counsel, Solomon Elsner, and shows evidence of careful professional assistance in its preparation and draftsmanship.
The testator's immediate family consisted of his wife,
Fannie, and one child, a boy, Frederick Fox Auerbach.
This son was of tender years, being only 11 at the time of
his father's death.
The chief properties owned by decedent at the time
of his death consisted of a one-third interest in the stock
of the Auerbach Company, which owns and operates a
department store in Salt Lake City~ and Auerbach Realty
Company, which owns valuable tracts of real estate and
improvements thereon in Salt Lake City. The Auerbach
Company was and always had been a closely held family
enterprise, as well as in the case of the realty company.
Following the death of decedent's father many years ago
the stock of the company and management of the store
camr under the control and ownership of the three Auerbach brothers, George. Frederick and Herbert, residing
in Salt Lake Cit,·. Their sisters. Bessie, Madeline. Selma
(plaintiffs herein), Josephine and Jennie, resided in New
York. .Josephine died man~· years ago and Jennie died
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on February 28, 1949.
The deceased, Frederick, and his brother, George, married the sisters Fannie and Beati·ice Fox of Hartford,
Connecticut. The Fox family for many years has owned
large property interests in the latter city, including a
nationally known department store. George pre-deceased
Frederick by several years and George's wife, Beatrice,
with her children, has since her husband's death permanently resided in Hartford. On his death, George's
one-third interest in the Auerbach store came under the
control of Beatrice. George and Beatrice had no sons,
all of their children being daughters. Following George's
death, the Auerbach store was managed and controlled
by the two surviving brothers, Frederick and Herbert.
Herbert never married and had no children. Decedent's
son, Frederick Fox Auerbach, was the only son to be
born to any of the three Auerbach brothers. It was only
natural that the Father of this boy should go to great
pains in his will to make it possible for the boy, as the
third generation, to one day succeed him and take over
the management of the store. This day, of course, would
be some time away because at the time of the execution
of his Father's will, the son was only 9 years old. Herbert,
however, could be relied on to undoubtedly assist the
boy in getting established in the business and carry on
the long family tradition of Auerbach control and ownership of the store.
The deceased and his brother, Herbert, were very close.
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They likewise enjoyed a very close family relationship
with their sisters in New York. Although George and
Frederick had married into the Fox family, one thing
is for sure, namely, neither Frederick nor Herbert ever
had any intention of permitting the ownership, management and control of the Auerbach store to be turned over
to the Fox family. Reciprocal option provisions (never
exercised) in both Frederick's and Herbert's wills to buy
each other's stock, together with the other provisions of
the will, show clearly the intent of Frederick to prevent
his one-third interest from following that of Beatrice back
to Hartford.
Along with his concern for keeping the Auerbach store
in the Auerbach family and protecting the future interests of his son, his brother, and his sisters, the deceased,
of course, had a real concern for making suitable and
harmonious provision for his wife, Fannie. The reconcilation of these various interests and objectives needed
a carefully drawn testamentary instrument and permitting it to be drafted by the Fox family attorney, Solomon
Elsner, would undoubtedly assure Fannie that her
interests were being adequately looked after. Accomplishment of his long range objectives without the
active opposition of his wife or Beatrice or other members
of the Fox fan1ily, to which he "·as now related by marriage, \\·as obviously to be desired by the testator.
Before turning to what the decedent did in his will,
it perhaps is of some significance to point out "·hat he

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
did not do. He did not, after making provision for certain specific legacies, leave all of the remainder and
residue of his property, including the Auerbach stock,
to his wife outright. He left it in trust to trustees with
active and broad specified powers and subject to certain
restrictions and conditions. In creating the trust, he did
not create a spend-thrift trust, nor did he give the trustees discretionary authority to invade principal in case
of need of the beneficiaries. He did not condition his
wife's right to life income from the trust upon her not
remarrying. He did not allocate a portion of the income
to the wife and a part to the boy. He left all the income
of the trust, no more and no less, to the wife for life
knowing that out of this income she would make adequate
provision for her son as circumstances might require and
until, as he hoped, the boy might succeed the Father in
the family business and have ample income of his own.
The appointment of and provisions concerning the
trustees of the trust shows evidence of particularly careful
planning. The plan adopted could hardly have been improved upon to accomplish his long-range objectives. He
set up a plan for the appointment of multiple trustees,
his wife one, his boy another when he reached 21, and
with authority for the appointment of others to handle
the actual work of administering the trust and to share
the responsibilities of voting control of the Auerbach stock
interests in the trust. Specific permission was given to delegate the powers of the trustees to a bank either in Hartford or Salt Lake City. He realized, of course, that his
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wife and boy were devoid of any business experience.
Fannie, however, could be expected to be largely dependent upon and influenced by Herbert during the latter's
lifetime. In any event the option provision covering the
Auerbach stock would almost compel such cooperation.
He knew that Herbert would, of course, leave his onethird interest in the stock to his sisters in New York.
Frederick realized that in the long run his estate's onethird interest in the store would stand directly between
the one-third interest in the Beatrice Fox family and the
one-third interest of Herbert in the Auerbach family.
The long range interests of the decedent's son would
best be accomplished by a long-term trust with voting
power of the Auerbach stock in the trust diluted and
shared throughout the lifetime of his wife between the
wife, the son and the other trustees to be appointed under
the will. Under such a plan neither Beatrice and her
successors nor Herbert and his successors would gain the
upper hand to the possible future prejudice of the boy.
Fannie, during her lifetime, as the boy's l\lother could,
of course, be expected to have an interest in protecting
and advancing her boy's interest. On the other hand, if
in the future for some reason she did not adequately look
after such interests, the boy upon becoming of age would
share and han? some say himself in the \·oting of the
Auerbach stork in the trust. Neither Fannie nor the boy
"·ithout the consent of each other or of the other trustees,
could thus during Fannie's lifetime do anything to prejudice the interests of the other. In fact, under this type
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of arrangement the boy's long range interests and possibilities of succeeding to the management of the store
could be expected to receive the sanction of both Auerbach and Fox sides of the family. In the event decedent's
wife refused or was unable to serve as trustee, specific provision in the will for the appointment of Beatrice to serve
in her place could be expected to accomplish the same
long range objective.
Under these somewhat complicated and unique family
circumstances, accomplishment of the testator's objectives
required the creation of a long-term trust in which the
corpus of the trust and voting control of the Auerbach
stock would be kept absolutely intact throughout his wife's
life. Not until she died could the trustees distribute the
two one-third portions of the trust principal to the boy.
The need of his wife for life income, as a member of the
quite solvent Fox family, was clearly a secondary and
minor consideration. The income she could take or leave
alone. A renunciation of his wife's interest in the income
would merely permit the boy as the next succeeding life
tenant under the trust to draw down the income. Under
no circumstances, however, was the management of the
trust principal and the control of the Auerbach stock to
leave the trustees until the actual death of his wife.
Throughout his wife's life (whether or not she drew income), he wanted the stock kept intact and under the
joint control of the boy and his Mother and their cotrustees. Not until his wife's death did he wish any part
of the stock to leave the friendly protection of the trust
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and run the risk of being squandered or disposed of by
the boy. After his wife died, he was agreeable to the partial distribution to his son of up to two-thirds of the Auerbach stock i£ at that time the trustees saw fit to give it to
him or if he had reached the ages of 30 or 45. The boy's
possible future issue would in any event be partially protected against the improvidence of their Father by receiving at least one-third of the trust estate on final
termination of the trust at the death of their Father. If
the boy were to die before his Mother, leaving issue, it was
of importance to decedent that all of the stock stay in
the family and go to these issue and if there were no issue,
stay in the family and go to his living sisters. The stock
of necessity would therefore have to stay intact in the
trust until the actual date of his wife's death. Furthermore, if the boy without issue predeceased his Mother and
Fannie outlived and survived decedent's sisters, the estate
would then pass by intestacy to decedent's heirs, that is,
the children of his sisters, Josephine and Selma, and his
brother, George, and still stay in the Auerbach family on
a non-preferential basis. All of these contingent beneficial
family rights in his son's unborn issue, in his sisters and
in his heirs would, of course, be cut off and destroyed if
prior to the death of Fannie the trust were permitted to
be prematurely terminated.
Although the testator ga,·e his wife a life income from
the trust, if she wanted it, and a life tenure as co-trustee,
the last thing in the world he intended was to give his
wife the sole and exclusive power and discretion in her
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lifetime to terminate the trust in whole or in part merely
by declining to draw down the trust income. Her renunciation or release of income has no connection whatsoever with the testator's specific and express intent of
keeping the trust estate completely intact and beyond the
possibility of waste and impairment until the death of his
wife.
The status of Fannie as co-trustee and her right to a life
income from the trust must be carefully separated and not
confused. The income she rna y take or by disclaimer
permit her boy to now receive. She cannot, however, in
her capacity as trustee, either alone or in concert with
her co-trustees, partially terminate the trust to the extent
of two-thirds of the principal prior to the time prescribed
therefor by the testator. The time so prescribed is the time
of her death and not before and even then only on certain
events. Fannie could, of course, theoretically renounce her
duties as co-trustee by resignation (which she has never
proposed to do), but such resignation would again not
have the slightest bearing on the testator's strong intention
to keep the Auerbach stock intact in the trust throughout
his wife's lifetime and under the joint or group control
of multiple trustees. Again, one thing is for sure, this
trust will never fail for want of trustees. The testator
wished until the date of his wife's death, part control of
the stock vested in his boy, part control in his wife or in
the event of her refusal to serve, in Beatrice, and part
control in others. He had good reasons for doing this.
His intention and the accomplishment of his objectives
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must be respected.
Let us turn now to the language of the will and see how
precisely and clearly the testator's intention and testamentary plan is spelled out in that instrument.
In the first subparagraph of paragraph Fourth of the
will, decedent left the residue of his estate to his trustees
in trust "the income therefrom to be paid to my beloved
wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach, for and during the term of
her natural life, and upon her death, or in case my said
wife shall die before I die, to my son, Frederick Fox
Auerbach, for and during the term of his natural life ... "
In the last subparagraph, the testator goes on to provide
that "Upon the death of my said son Frederick Fox Auerbach, or in case my said son shall predecease my wife, then
upon the death of my said wife, the trust hereby created
shall cease and terminate, ... " The testator then provides
on such termination for payment of the principal per
stirpes to his son's living issue and, if there be no issue,
to his living sisters share and share alike.
The above provisions are referred to as showing beyond
any question the basic intent of the testator to create a
long-term trust which, according to his direction, must
continue throughout the lifetimes of both his "ife and his
son and with the trust principal to be kept intact beyond
the possibility of impairment during this period. Not until
thr death of the survi,·or of his wife and boy is the trust
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to finally and completely terminate.
Spaced in between the above provisions which are at
the beginning and end of paragraph Fourth and which
provide for the creation, continuance and final termination of the trust for the specified period, are provisions by
way exception which authorize, subject to certain events
and conditions, a partial termination of the trust and distribution of up to two-thirds of the trust principal to the
son. It is of special significance that these intermediate
provisions relating to a partial invasion of trust principal
by the son are by way of exception and only authorize a
distribution of carefully measured amounts under certain
specified conditions. We say the provisions are by way
of exception because the will itself says " . . . excepting
that if my said son Frederick Fox Auerbach, at the time
of the death of my said wife ... " shall have reached 45
he shall receive two-thirds of the principal but if he is 30
and not yet 45 " ... at the time of the death of my said
wife ...", he shall receive one-third of the principal and
another one-third when he does reach 45. The above provisions deal with the situation where "at the time of the
death of" his wife, the boy has reached 45 or at least 30
years of age. The following sentence goes on to provide
that if the boy is not 30 " ... at the time of thte death of
my said wife .. .",he is to receive one-third when he does
reach 30 and another one-third when he reaches 45.
We invite the Court's attention to the difference in
language between the boy's right to succeed his Mother to
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the income of the trust " ... upon her death ... ", and
his right to invade principal only if " ... at the time of the
death of my said wife, ... " he shall have reached the
specified ages. The right to invade is thus specifically
conditional upon the happening of two events in time,
namely, the actual date or time of death of decedent's
wife and the attainment of the specified ages by the boy.
The second subparagraph of paragraph Fourth goes
on to provide that the trustees are authorized"... in their
discretion, to anticipate payment of the principal amounts
which my said son, pursuant to the terms of this my Will_,
is entitled to receive at the respective ages of thirty and
forty-five years ... " except that not more than one-third
can be paid before he is 30, nor more than another onethird after 30. This subparagraph quite clearly only permits the trustees to ignore, in their discretion, in part the
age restrictions on the boy in making payment of principal. It gives them no authority to ignore the additional and
separate condition that no principal can be paid to the
boy until the actual date or time of death of his Mother.
Anticipation is permitted only of amounts which the boy
"pursuant to the terms of this my Will" is entitled to receive. Under the preceding terms of the will, in the first
subparagraph, no payments of principal are permitted
until the time of the Mother's death. In other words, the
trustees are given partial discretion to wah ·e the age restriction of the boy but not the death restriction of the
Mother. Authority to waive one condition is not authority for the waiver of a second.
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Paragraph Sixth of the will deals with the appointment
and powers of the executrix and trustees under the will.
It is unnecessary to repeat here the broad, detailed and
extensive powers conferred upon the trustees by decedent.
Suffice it to say that this paragraph provides for and
contemplated the appointment of a group of trustees with
no limitation as to number, composed of decedent's wife
or, in the event of her prior death or refusal or inability to
serve, Beatrice Fox Auerbach, the son when he became
21, and others. Specific authority was given for the delegation of powers to a bank in either Hartford or Salt Lake
City or to engage the services of any such bank in administering the trust estate. The appointment of any
trustee was to be recorded in the Probate Court in which
the will was probated. The trustees are given all powers
of control and management over the trust estate which
decedent would himself have had, if living, including
power to invest, reinvest, sell, dispose of , mortgage, lease,
convey, etc. The will is silent on the point as to whether
specific action by the trustees may be taken without unanimous consent. All trustees are to serve without bond.
The provisions evince a clear intent that no temporary,
short-term arrangement was being contemplated but one
of long-term duration and where" ... in the event of any
vacancy, either by death or resignation. . ." among the
trustees, other and succeeding trustees were and are to be
appointed to carry out and accomplish the desires and
objectives of the testator.
We turn now to the citation of various authorities which

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
demonstrate conclusively that a testator in creating a
testamentary trust may keep the trust principal intact
throughout the lifetime of his wife or other prescribed
period and in the accomplishment of his objectives and
purposes, prevent the termination of the trust either in
whole or in part until those objectives and purposes have
been accomplished.
A case very closely parallel to the family situation here
involved is Re Hamburger~ ( 1924) 185 Wis. 270, 201
N.W. 267, 37 A.L.R. 1413. Nathan Hamburger, Sr., had
been admitted as a partner, in 1883, to the firm of Gimbel
Brothers having originally, as a boy of 13, entered the
employ of Adam Gimbel, founder of the business. In
1910, at the time of his death, Hamburger was vice-president of Gimbel Brothers, Incorporated, and in charge
of the Milwaukee store. His immediate family consisted
of his wife and one son, Nathan, Jr., who at the time of
his Father's death was about 13 years of age. Five sons
and nine grandsons of Adam Gimbel and the son of
deceased, Nathan Hamburger, Jr. (from 1923 when he
became 21), were all connected "·ith the business.
By his will dated a short time before his death Nathan
Hamburger, Sr., after certain specific bequests to relatives
and charities, left all of the residue and remainder of his
estate to trustees to hold and in,·est the same and pay the
net incon1e thereof to his beloved "·ife, Bertha Hamburger, so long as she 1nay live and with power to dispose
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come part of her intestate estate. Bertha (who subsequently remarried) was appointed and became one of
four trustees. Among the assets of the trust were 23,000
shares of Gimbel Brothers, Incorporated. The wife, as
trustee, wished to transfer 1,000 of these shares to her son,
Nathan, Jr., who now holding an executive position in the
Philadelphia store desired to have a substantial interest
in the business. Two of the trustees approved of the action
but the trustee bank declined on the ground of lack of
authority. In an action brought by the son to construe the
will, the lower court ruled that the trustees were authorized to make the assignment of the shares in the store
from the trust to the son. On appeal this judgment was
reversed. The Court stated:
"He (the testator) had accumulated by his personal effort a very considerable fortune. It seems
clea11 to us that in disposing of it by will, his paramount object was to make certain that during her
life his widow should have every comfort suitable
to her rank in life. Next to this purpose was the
desire to make suitable provision for his only son,
Nathan, then a small boy. He had doubtless observed enough of the vicissitudes of life to realize
that it often happens that fortunes accumulated by
the industry and economy of a lifetime, may be
lost, in the hands of persons inexperienced in business affairs, in a twelvemonth. He therefore made
very careful and elaborate provision for such care
and preservation of his estate during the life of
his widow as to guard against such possibilities.
The widow was not appointed to act as trustee
alone, but two other trustees in whom he had confidence were named."
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A leading case is Claflin v. Claflin (1889) 149 Mass.
19, 3 L.R.A. 370, 20 N.E. 454, where the testator left the
residue of his estate to trustees "to sell and dispose of the
same and to pay to my wife, Mary A. Claflin, one third
part of the proceeds thereof, and to pay to my son Clarence A. Claflin one third part of the proceeds thereof, and
to pay the remaining one third part thereof to my son
Adelbert E. Claflin in the manner following, viz.: $10,000
when he is of the age of twenty-one years; $10,000 when
he is of the age of twenty-five years; and the balance when
he is of the age of thirty years." The Court sustained the
provisions of the will and refused to permit the son upon
reaching his majority to take the remaining installments
prior to his attainment of the ages specified in the will.
The Court stated:
"In the case at bar nothing has happened which
the testator did not anticipate, and for which he
has not made provision. It is plainly his will that
neither the income nor any part of the principal
should now be paid to the plaintiff. It is true that
the plaintiff's interest is alienable' by him, and can
be taken by his creditors to pay his debts; but it
does not follow because the testator has not imposed all possi.ble restrictions that the rest_ric~ons
which he has 1mposed should not be earned mto
effect."

As summarized in 123 A.L.R. 1427:
"It may be stated a~ the ~utset that. subject to
considerations of pubhc pohcy, the nght of an
owner of property to project his wishes into the
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future to regulate the disposition of his property
is recognized in law, and any rule purporting to

deal with the right of the beneficiaries to terminate
a trust by mutual consent before the expiration of
the limitation prescribed for the trust by its creator
must, of necessity, be subordinate to the expressed
or implied purposes of the settlor in creating the
trust, and to his express or implied direction not to
terminate the trust within its fixed duration. If
those purposes are not executed but remain executory, and if they require the continuance of the
trust so that the wishes and desires of the creator
may be substantiated, by the better view the trust
will not be terminated, although all the beneficiaries, both those who have a present interest in the
trust and those who have or may have a future
interest, vested or contingent, mutually consent to
the termination of the trust and the surrender of
the trust property to the respective beneficiaries
as their interests may appear under the trust instrument."

In Mohler v. Wesner (1943) 382 Ill. 225,47 NE2d 64,
two specific conditions were involved, that is, the attainment by one beneficiary of 21 years of age and the death
of another beneficiary. The Court held that the second
condition not having been met, there could be no termination of the trust even though the beneficiary whose
death was made a condition waived his rights under
the trust and it appeared that contingent interests could
not be determined until the death of such beneficiary.
The Court said:
"For reasons best known to herself, the testatrix
saw fit to provide an income for her nephew and
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to designate as the ultimate beneficiaries of her
estate her nephew's children, or in the event any
one or more of his children predeceased him, then
their heirs-at-law at the time of the termination
of the trust. The validity of this provision is not
assailed, and it is the duty of the courts to render
it effective and to not frustrate the clearly expressed intention of the testatrix. The purposes
of the trust have not been substantially satisfied;
there are contingent interests in the trust fund,
and a present determination of the ultimate beneficiaries would be sheer speculation."
Remembering that the will of Frederick S. Auerbach
was executed in Hartford, Connecticut, we invite the
Court's particular attention to the leading case of Hills vs.
Travelers Bank & Trust Company (1939) 125 Conn. 640,
7 A. 2d 652, 123 A.L.R. 1419, involving the same issue
as the case at bar.
In this case Charles I. Hills transferred certain property
to a trustee in trust to pay the net income in thirds to
Matilda King Hills and to Charles and Thomas, her sons,
or to the immediate issue of said sons, if either or both
shall die before she does, so long as Matilda King Hills
shall live. It was provided that upon the death of Mrs.
Hills, the trustee should hold the property for the joint
benefit of Charles and Thomas until they respectively
reached thr age of 30 years at which time the trust property was to be transferred to them. It was also provided
that should either of the sons die before their Mother
or after her and before attaining the age of 30 leaYing
immediate issue, such issue upon the death of Matilda or
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upon the death of either subsequent to her death and before arriving at age 30, should receive the property their
parent would have received per stirpes. In the event of
the death of either before the age of 30, it was provided
that the income should be paid to the survivor or his issue
and upon the Mother's death or in the event of the death
of either after her death and before reaching 30 without
issue, the principal to be paid to the survivor or to his
issue per stirpes if he died leaving issue.
The elder Hills had died in 1915 leaving his widow
and the two sons, plaintiffs in the action, as his sole heirs.
It appeared at time of the suit that Charles was 38 years
old, married and with no children except an adopted son
aged 16. Thomas was 33 years of age and still unmarried.
Mrs. Hills was 60 years of age. In 1938, the Mother signed an instrument purporting to relinquish all her interest
in the trust estate. Plaintiffs filed suit to compel the
trustee to transfer to them the trust estate and then by an
amended complaint sought to compel disribution of twothirds of the property with the remainder to be continued
in trust for the benefit of the Mother until her death and
distributed equally to plaintiffs at the time of her death.
The lower Court's judgment permitted the trust termination and sustained the claims of plaintiffs. The Judgment of the lower Court was, however, reversed upon
appeal, the Court upholding the trustee's construction
of the instrument that irrespective of whether the sons
had now attained the age of 30, "only upon the death of
Mrs. Hills is either son, or if he dies before her, his immed-
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iate issue, if any, entitled to receive his share of the trust
property... " Furthermore, " ... until the death of Mrs.
Hills unborn issue of either son have a potential beneficial interest in the trust."
The Court stated:
"Under the meaning which we ascribe to the
terms of the trust deed the plaintiffs have, during
the life of Mrs. Hills, only a right to one-third
each of the income of the trust. Both having
reached the age of thirty years, each has a vested
third interest in the trust fund, subject to divestment by his death before that of Mrs. Hills....
If such death occurs his rights, both to income
during the remainder of Mrs. Hills' life and in the
principal upon her death, would pass to his issue,
if any, or, if he leave no issue, to the other son if
he survives, or, if not, to his issue, and such successor would not take by inheritance but under
the trust instrument itself.... It follows that possible unborn issue of each plaintiff have a potential
interest under the trust.
"The function of the court with reference to
trusts is not be remake the trust instrument, reduce
or increase the size of the gifts made therein or
accord the beneficiary more advantage than the
donor directed that he should enjoy, but rather to
ascertain what the donor directed that the donee
should receive and to secure to him the enjoyment
of that interest only. . . . Conditions precedent
which should concur in order to warrant termination of a trust by judicial decree include "that all
the parties in interest unite in seeking the termination, that every reasonable purpose of the trust's
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creation and existence llas been accomplished, and
that no fair and lawful restriction imposed by the
[settlor] will be nullified or disturbed by such a
result." ... Under the construction which we accord to the trust deed and the relevant facts of
the present situation these conditions do not appear to be satisfied. The first of these is that all
of the parties in interest must unite in seeking the
termination. If some such parties are not competent to act for themselves or are yet unborn, it is
obvious that their 'interests, whether presently
vested or contingent, should be properly represented and protected. Unborn immediate issue of
each of the plaintiffs have a contingent interest in
both income and principal, but they are unrepresented. As the trust is not of a public or charitable
nature the purpose of making the attorney general a party defendant ... is not apparent, but it
cannot be and is not now claimed that his presence
as a party affords adequate representation for unborn issue of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs may not
be regarded as themselves representing them since
their interests are not identical ... and as the conclusions of the trial court are not 'as favorable to
them as they could possibly claim' ... , we cannot
say that they could suffer no detriment from lack
of representation. 'The court will not allow the
cestuis with vested interests to shut out the existing
or possible future cestuis by procuring a court decree for termination and for distribution among
the present holders of vested interests.' ...
"Also, since we construe the trust deed as expressing an intent that the plaintiffs should notreceive the principal until the death of Mrs. Hills,
that pp.rpose has not been accomplished. ~nd
cannot be until her decease and the restnct1on
so imposed would be nullified by an earlier
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termination of the trust as to them and distribution to them from the corpus of the trust
estate . . . Termination is to be limited to
cases where not only all the interests created
have vested and the parties are sui juris and represented but also the design and object of the trust
has been at least practically accomplished. . . .
When, as here, the distribution under the trust
is limited to income during a period measured by
a specified lifetime and the present holders of a
vested interest may through death during that period be succeeded, by substitution under the terms
of the instrument as distinguished from by inheritance, by issue yet unborn, there are 'contingent
interests which are not now determinable but
which must not be disregarded.' and the trust must
continue so long as does the contingency. . . .
The consequence is that it is incumbent upon the
trustee to continue to administer the trust not only
as to Mrs. Hills' one-third share, but also as to the
other two-thirds 'so long as Mrs. Hills shall live'
and upon her decease, only, will distribution of
the principal be permissable.
"There is error and the case is remanded to the
Superior Court with direction to render judgment
for the defendants."

In Afoxley v. Title Insurance & Trust Company, 27
Cal. 2d 457, 165 P2d 15, 163 A.L.R. 838, it appeared
that a trust had been created for the benefit of a 16 year
old daughter to accumulate the income subject to a discretionary power to make expenditures thereof for the
daughter's support care, and education until she should
attain the age of 35. when she was to receive the trust
property and all accumulations of income, with a further
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provision that should the daughter die before reaching
the age of 35 the trust property should go to her child
or children, or in default of children to her appointee, or
in default of appointment to certain· named beneficiaries.
the daughter, at age 26 and when married but without
children, sought to terminate the trust. This the Court
refused to do and stated:
"Ordinarily, the function of the court with
reference to active trusts is not to remake the
trust instrument, reduce or increase the size of
the gifts made therein or accord the beneficiary
more advantage than the donor directed that
he should enjoy, but rather to ascertain what the
donor directed that the donee should receive and
to secure to him the enjoyment of that interest."

In Stevenson v. Stevenson) 205 Ill. App. 15 ( 1917),
the will provided that all remaining property of testator
be held for the benefit of the wife for life and on her
death five named individuals (nephews and nieces) were
to be paid certain specified amounts, "provided they are
living at the time of the death of my wife." The Court
held that upon the renunciation by the widow of her life
interest, the trust did not terminate and the interest of
the nephews and nieces was not to be accelerated.
In re Byrnel Estate) 149 Misc. 449, 267 N.Y.S. 627
(1933) involved a will wherein the testator gave the
residue of his estate in trust for his widow for life or until
her remarriage and upon her death or remarriage to
such children of Ronald (brother of the testator) as were
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living-at the time of the death or remarriage of the widow
and to the issue of any deceased child of Ronald living
at either of those events. Upon the renunciation by the
widow of her interest in the trust by electing to take her
statutory share, the Court held that the trust could not be
terminated until the death of the widow and that the
trust principal could not be presently distributed to
Ronald's children.
Section 337 of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts
provides:
"CONSENT OF BENEFICIARIES.
( 1 ) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if
all of the beneficiaries of a trust consent and
none of them is under an incapacity, they can
compel the termination of the trust.
( 2 ) If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the
trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination."
Again, Section 340 provides:
"Where Some of the Beneficiaries Do Not
Consent.
( 1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) and
in Sees. 335 and 336 (purposes illegal or impossible of accomplishment 1, if one or more of
the beneficiaries of a trust do not consent to its
termination or are under ari incapacity, the
others cannot compel the termination of the
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trust, except in accordance with the terms of the
trust.
( 2) Although one or more of the beneficiaries of a trust do not consent to its termination
or are under an incapacity, the court may decree
a partial termination of the trust if the interests
of the beneficiaries who do not consent or are
under an incapacity are not prejudiced thereby
and if the continuance of the trust is not necessary to carry out a material purpose of the
trust."
Comment g. states:
"When partial termination not permitted. If
one or more of the beneficiaries of a trust do not
consent to its termination or are not ascertained
or are under an incapacity, the others cannot
compel the partial termination of the trust, if
the interest of the non-consenting beneficiaries
may be prejudiced thereby."
Scott on Trusts, Sec. 340.2, Vol. III, 2nd Ed., states
as follows:
"Partial termination. As has been stated, the
beneficiaries of a trust if they all concur can
compel the termination of the trust as to a part
of the property, unless the continuance of the
trust of all the property is necessary to carry out
a material purpose of the trust. Where some of
the beneficiaries do not concur, however, the
others cannot compel a termination of the trust
as to a part of the trust property unless the interests of the nonconsenting beneficiaries are
not prejudiced by such partial termination.
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In a number of cases the court has refused
to decree the partial termination of the trust
where some of the beneficiaries did not consent.
In some of these cases doubtless the court would
not have permitted the partial termination of
the trust even if all of the beneficiaries had
consented, since this would defeat the intention
of the settlor in creating the trust. But even if
the partial termination of the trust would not
defeat the intention of the settlor, the court will
not permit such termination over the objections
of som.e of the beneficiaries."
In 163 A.L.R. 858 under the sub-heading "As affected
by the contingent character of the interests involved," it
is stated:
" ... it is quite generally recognized that where
some of the interests created under the trust
depend for their vesting upon the happening of
contingencies which have not yet occurred at
the time of the application for the termination
of the trust, and the interests so created remain
contingent either because of the uncertainty of
the event upon the occurrence of which they are
to vest or uncertainty of the persons in whom
they are to vest, as where some of the possible
beneficiaries are unborn, the trust will not be
terminated although its termination is consented
to by all the existing beneficiaries who have a
vested interest therein, present or future, because
in such case the condition that consent of all the
beneficiaries must be procured to terminate the
trust cannot be complied with before the happening of the. contingencv and. the _vesting of
the interest, since those who Will ultimately be
entitled to the corpus of the estate cannot be
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predetermined. Walter v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue (1942: CCA 3d) 127 F 2d 101;
... Botzum v. Havana Nat. Bank ( 1937) 367
Ill. 539, 12 NE 2d 203; . . . Bowers' Estate
(1943) 346 Pa. 85, 29 A2d 519; Richenbach's
Estate ( 1943) 348 Pa. 121, 34 A2d 527; Kamerly's Estate ( 1944) 348 Pa. 225, 35 A2d 258."
Further citation of authority would unnecessarily prolong the brief but the Court's attention is invited to the
cases collected in the following annotations:
169 A.L.R. 459
165 A.L.R. 550
163 A.L.R. 852
123 A.L.R. 1427
45 A.L.R. 743
37 A.L.R. 1420
2 A.L.R. 579
Under the facts of the present case and the applicable
authorities, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment
of the Court below is in error and should be reversed
insofar as it permits the partial termination of the Frederick S. Auerbach trust prior to the time prescribed therefor by the testator in his will merely by reason of the
relinquishment by the widow of her life interest in the
income from the trust. The trust is an active trust whose
purposes are not yet from any point of view accomplished.
It is not for Fannie, or her new husband, or decedent's son,
or Walker Bank & Trust Company, or the Court, to
rewrite the will of Frederick S. Auerbach. By language
as plain as day, he gave his son no right whatsoever to
get at any of the trust principal, including the Auerbach
stock, until the time of his Mother's death. The unborn
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issue of the son, the plaintiffs as sisters of the deceased
and the heirs of the deceased all have contingent rights in
this trust which cannot be taken from them without their
consent. The four new trusts substituting the children or
grandchildren of Beatrice as contingent beneficiaries in
decedent's assets, in lieu of plaintiffs, was not the intention
of Frederick S. Auerbach. If this had been his desire, he
would have said so in his will.
The deceased had his reasons for continuing the trust
on a long-term basis throughout the lifetime of his wife
and the lifetime of his son and only permitting a partial
termination of the trust and partial invasion of trust
principal by the son at the time of the death of his wife.
Whether these reasons be good or bad is not here material.
Decedent's purposes, as heretofore shown, included,
among others, an intention to put his assets during his
wife's lifetime beyond the danger of impairment and the
hazard of waste, to put the voting rights of his Auerbach
stock under the joint control of a group of trustees, to
deprive both his wife and his son of the exclusive right
to vote and control the Auerbach stock, to deprive his
wife and his son of the actual management and administration of the trust assets and have this work performed
by a bank, to keep the stock under friendly trustee protection on a basis calculated in the long run to help and
further the interests of his only son in the Auerbach
Company, and, finally, to keep the Auerbach Company
in the Auerbach family where it had always been since
it was originally founded by the Auerbach family.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43
POINT II,·
THE PRESENT ACTION BEING BROUGHT TO
PROTECT AND CONSERVE THE TRUST ESTATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENTION OF
THE TESTATOR, PLAINTIFFS· ARE ENTITLED
TO AN ALLOWANCE FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES.
The purpose of the present action is to prevent the
illegal invasion of trust principal and dissipation of the
trust estate by the testamentary trustees appointed under
the will of Frederick S. Auerbach, deceased. The effect
of the proceeding will be to, conserve and protect the
trust assets in accordance with the intention of the testator.
The compensation of attorneys retained by a legatee,
distributee or person beneficially interested in the ·estate
is held to be a proper charge against the estate where the
services of such attorneys, as in the present case, are of
value to the entire estate and have the effect of inuring
to the benefit of the estate as a whole. The determination
of a reasonable attorneys' fee lies within the discretion of
the Court depending upon the facts and circumstances of
the particular case. A construction of the will as sought
for by plaintiffs will quite clearly be of benefit not solely
to plaintiffs as contingent beneficiaries but in protecting
the interest of all of the persons beneficially interested
in the trust estate, including decedent's widow and son,
the son's unborn issue and plaintiffs, and the heirs of the
deceased. The construction of the will asked for rna y
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never be of benefit to plaintiffs. They may predecease
the widow. The son may survive his mother. The son
may predecease his Mother but leave issue surviving the
Mother. The widow may survive both plaintiffs and the
son without issue, in which event an intestacy would be
involved. Plaintiffs are only asking that the trust be administered strictly in accordance with the intention of
the testator.
In these circumstances, it was error for the Court below
to deny plaintiffs' request for the allowance of reasonable
attorneys' fees as a charge against the estate.
See: Becht v. Miller: Mich., 273 N.W. 294; Matter of
Cannariato, N.Y., 287 N.Y.S. 1010; In re Gratton's Estate, Ore., 298 P. 231; In re Mundt Estates, Wash., 14
P2d 59; Steger v. Gibson, Okla., 287 P2d 687; Temlan
v. Reeve, Ill., 65 N.E. 2d 815.
Respectfully submitted,
C. M. GILMOUR,
Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
REICHMAN. \'ERNON &
BENNETT.
Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
OTTERBOURG, STEINDLER,
HOUSTON & ROSEN,
200 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York
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